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Introductory note 
This study stemmed from the need perceived by the Portuguese Platform of NGDOs 
(PPNGDO) to produce knowledge that will help its members carry out a more informed analysis 
of the changes in International development cooperation (hereafter, development cooperation). 
Understanding the transformation underway and the challenges it presents is fundamental for 
the PPNGDO and its members to jointly outline possible paths into the future, setting out the 
future direction of action, their priorities and their options.  
The study was conducted with three goals in mind:  
1) tracing the progress of development cooperation over the past 20 years, while reflecting 
and discussing the ongoing changes in a multiplex world; 
2) addressing the challenges faced by key public and private development cooperation 
actors view of the ongoing change; 
3) contributing to the discussion on this new configuration of development cooperation by 
offering guidelines based on adaptation and innovation for thinking and acting in a 
complex, fragmented and fragile multiplex world. 
This study sought to review the available academic and grey literature (reports from 
development cooperation organisations, blog posts, online discussions and interviews), and 
where possible, interviews with professionals from international organisations – both 
governmental and non-governmental – were used. 
In the introduction of the study, we contextualise development cooperation in a changing 
world and describe the framework for discussion applied to each of the following sections: In Part 
I, changes in development cooperation and ODA are addressed, based on three issues that are 
crucial for the sectors: quantity, quality and legitimacy. Part II highlights the challenges faced by 
key public and private actors of development cooperation - either ‘“traditional’” or ‘“new’” ones. 
Finally, Part III outlines a few guidelines on complexity, fragmentation, and fragility, which can 
provide useful tools for analysis in the new context. To conclude, we offer civil society 
organisations some points for reflection.  
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INTRODUCTION: The context of development cooperation in a changing world 
Critical moments: Covid-19 and the acceleration of history 
As with other pandemics and epidemics in the past, such as the black plague in Europe 
in the 14th century, the Spanish flu in 1918-20, and HIV/AIDS in Africa in the 1990s, the Covid-
19 pandemic can be analysed as a critical juncture in the current international environment, in 
particular in international development cooperation, and in the concept of development itself 
(Green 2020; Leach et al. 2020). Health crises are extremely unpredictable and can result in 
substantial shifts in power systems that can either be positive (benefiting those who were on the 
weaker and more fragile side) or negative (reinforcing those who were already in a position of 
strength). Thus, pandemics can function as turning points that open several paths, various 
possible answers, which, when chosen, will have consequences that go far beyond public health. 
However, it is fundamental to look at these critical moments as one-off events in the 
historical framework of which they are a part.  On April 7, 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic was still 
in its early days, but already showing signs of the global health crisis it would become, and 
Richard Haas published an article in Foreign Affairs magazine called ‘The pandemic will 
accelerate history rather than reshape it: not every crisis is a turning point’. In the article, contrary 
to the many convictions already expressed at the time about the capacity of the crisis to bring 
about profound changes to the problems facing our societies, the president of the Council on 
Foreign Relations1 argued that the pandemic (and, in particular, countries’ responses to the 
health crisis) would revive and reinforce the geopolitical trends of recent decades, rather than 
mark a turning point towards new paths (Haas 2020). Haas’s thesis seems to be proving correct: 
in several fields we have observed not a sudden change or an unexpected shift, but what appears 
to be a reinforcement and acceleration of trends that had been taking place and evolving for the 
past two decades. Development cooperation, as a foreign policy, whether guided by selfless 
motives and/or promoting different national interests, is no exception, and so it is important to 
understand the geopolitical and geo-economic challenges and dilemmas it faces and to 
contextualise them in the current historical moment.  
 
 
1 The Council on Foreign Relations is a Leading think tank worldwide in the area of international and 
external policy studies (https://www.cfr.org/). Founded in 1921, it also in charge of publishing the 
magazine Foreign Affairs. 
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The 21st century and the multiplex world 
This study takes a basic argument as the starting point: the dominant paradigm on 
development cooperation and the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA), embedded in 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), is undergoing a process of gradual reform, but its purpose is still 
being questioned. Consequently, its future shape is still uncertain. This questioning and 
uncertainty reflect the systemic changes taking place in the world that challenge the future of the 
international liberal order underlying the architecture of development cooperation and ODA 
defined in the OECD-DAC framework. Development cooperation is part of what has been called 
the international liberal order that emerged at the end of the Second World War and was 
strengthened by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.  The Covid-19 pandemic revealed several 
cracks in this order that were already opening up in the last two decades and that are connected 
to the pillars that have sustained this liberal international order led by the US and Europe:   
• the set of organisations and multilateral provisions that established global governance 
rules, beginning in 1945; 
• liberal democracy as a goal that is both desirable and attainable; 
• liberal capitalism as the preferential system of social and economic organisation; 
• the State as a lead actor for the design and implementation of public policies; 
• civil society as an active and influential actor of public policy assessment and monitoring. 
These pillars have come under growing pressure at various levels. The visible crisis of 
global governance, exemplified dramatically in 2020 by the US withdrawal from the World Health 
Organization2, is one side of what international relations expert Amitav Acharya has called the 
multiplex world (Acharya 2017). International relations are no longer suited to a bipolar, unipolar 
or multipolar system of hegemonic powers – western ones, in particular –, where governments 
are the key players. Instead, we observe a growing multiplicity of actors in the global order 
(governments, international institutions, multinational companies, non-governmental 
 
2 This decision was made after the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement on climate change announced 
in November 2019 and effective November 4, 2020, one day after the US presidential election (See 
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/11/04/trump-begins-formal-us-withdrawal-paris-agreement/, 4 
November 2019, accessed on 6 March 2021). One of the first decisions made by the Biden 
administration was to reverse the two decisions made by the Trump administration, to return to the Paris 
Agreement and resume WHO funding (See https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/11/04/trump-
begins-formal-us-withdrawal-paris-agreement/, 22 January 2021, accessed on 6 March 2021). 
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organisations, individuals, transnational movements, and other non-state actors) and an also 
increasing complexity of global challenges that transcend borders. Such challenges are 
multidimensional issues, often unpredictable and impossible to resolve at the national scale. 
These are not necessarily new problems, but they have become more urgent and apparent: 
financial crises, pandemics, migration, climate change.  
 
Consequently, the study addresses development cooperation in this new multiplex world 
that has abandoned the traditional divide between ‘rich countries in the North’ and ‘poor countries 
in the South’. The multiplex world brings together a growing diversity of actors at all scales with 
increasingly complex relationships. To quote Amitav Acharya, ‘A multiplex world is like a multiplex 
cinema – one that gives its audience a choice of various movies, actors, directors, and plots all 
under the same roof. […] It is not a singular global order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of 
crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and globalisms.’  (Acharya 2017).  
Development cooperation in the multiplex world 
Multiplexity is of particular importance, because it allows the different development 
cooperation players to revisit recent history and reconstruct the international liberal order that 
structured its own architecture after World War II.  As this order grows weaker, the development 
cooperation model itself is weakening. The break came in 2016: both the Brexit vote and Trump’s 
election made it clear that something had changed. In this study, we argue that this change 
occurred on a planetary scale and has accelerated since the beginning of the 21st century.  
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The economic (re)emergence of southern countries whose priorities were not in line with 
the dominant vision of liberal capitalism as the preferred system of social and economic 
organisation has challenged the economic leadership and hegemony of the North and its recipes 
for development based on its overvaluation of the role of the market, which have shaped its 
development cooperation in the OECD-DAC framework. China’s economic re-emergence is a 
clear example, albeit not the only one: economic growth and development in East Asia were 
driven by the countries that guided the markets, with telling outcomes in the level of 
industrialisation and poverty reduction (Wade 1992; Yeung 2009). Because China was the 
world’s leading economy up until 1870, its economic re-emergence is a good starting point for 
rethinking development cooperation modalities and mechanisms at two levels: economic and 
political. In economic terms, while there is no consensus on the nature of the impact of China’s 
presence in Africa (positive or negative), it is already the main (single) trading partner of the 
African continent and it has invested heavily and openly in infrastructure in the major economies. 
After creating its own development cooperation agency in 2018, China’s new White Paper 
launched in 2021 highlights the willingness and importance that the world’s second economic 
power, which has not endorsed the liberal order and is not a member of the OECD-DAC, attaches 
to this foreign policy, mainly in geo-economic terms.3 At the same time, the success of China's 
authoritarian state capitalism, where civil society has virtually no voice, may become an attractive 
model for less industrialised countries with poorly consolidated democratic political systems. In 
the multiplex world, this means that political and economic liberalisation are no longer hegemonic 
visions.  
The global economic transformation in the dynamics of industrial production in recent 
decades has not only created ties of greater trade dependence between North and South, but it 
has also put the private sector, regardless of location, at the centre of global development. The 
production, distribution and marketing of goods and services began being carried out along 
complex chains involving companies in the North and South (Gereffi 2018). While these new 
dynamics have resulted in greater economic growth, industrialisation and the emergence of a 
strong private sector in southern economies (Yeung 2016), the traditional problems of dependent 
development associated with labour rights, inequalities, environmental justice, and gender 
equality still persist. 
 
3 http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202101/10/content_WS5ffa6bbbc6d0f72576943922.html 
and https://www.odi.org/blogs/10624-china-s-new-development-agency-five-expert-views  
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Critical juncture(s) of development cooperation: response to the pandemic and 
architectural changes 
 
First, the pandemic is a critical juncture at the operational level, in terms of the capacity 
of development cooperation to respond to the health crisis and its consequences. Secondly, the 
immediate consequences of the pandemic at various levels bring additional challenges to the 
functioning and future of development cooperation and its architecture. 
At the operational level, development cooperation actors (from bilateral and multilateral 
agencies to NGDOs and private foundations) have argued from the outset that humanitarian aid 
and ODA systems can (and should) play a major role in responding to the health crisis in low- 
and middle-income countries, as well as in addressing its devastating economic and social 
consequences. Existing mechanisms, such as debt forgiveness and ODA itself (more constant 
compared to private capital flows), should be used in the short to medium term to help release 
funds rapidly to respond to the anticipated economic and social consequences of the pandemic, 
especially in low- and middle-income countries (UNCTAD 2020; Concord 2020). Similarly, the 
traditional development cooperation actors (OECD-DAC bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies 
of the UN system and/or NGDOs) are in a privileged position to identify the areas where 
inequalities are exacerbated by the pandemic (DfID and Oxfam 2020) and thus respond quickly, 
effectively and efficiently to the needs of the most vulnerable countries and populations, leaving 
no one behind.  
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At the level of the development cooperation architecture, the Covid-19 pandemic 
highlights and accelerates trends and challenges that already exist in the functioning of the 
system itself. Not only do the traditional actors have to adapt their response to an unprecedented 
health crisis, without neglecting the work underway and their response to current multiple crises, 
there is a renewed urgency to:   
• Secure financial resources:  In a scenario where rich and donor countries are themselves 
facing an unprecedented crisis within their own borders and in the broader context of the 
loss of ODA relevance, a potential reduction in ODA flows is anticipated, even though we 
know that a global crisis such as this one requires a collective action response that also 
prioritises Low-income countries, where ODA is still of central importance (Concord 
2020). 
• Fulfil long-standing promises to localise aid: Due to international travel restrictions and 
health security procedures, facing the challenge of localisation becomes inevitable 
(Doane 2019). The unprecedented immediate repatriation that followed the closing of 
borders in many countries left many senior positions in local organisations vacant and 
forced ongoing work to be interrupted, thus reigniting the debate about the localisation of 
aid and the decolonisation of the sector itself (#ShiftThePower 2020). 
• Show innovation capacity: The system and its traditional actors feel increasingly 
compelled to innovate their practices, ideas, and organisational models, by (finally) 
adapting them also to the overlapping reality of climate emergency and the collapse of 
biodiversity, the transformation of human mobility into a security issue, emerging 
technologies, widening inequalities between and within countries, and types of 
authoritarianism on a global scale (ICVA 2020). 
The need that development cooperation faces to rethink its legitimacy and place in the 
world cuts across all of these urgent challenges and is intrinsically linked to changes in the rules 
of the game in a multiplex world. development cooperation and its traditional actors can no longer 
ignore the legitimate claims for greater participation by countries and organisations that 
historically have not had access to traditional decision-making centres: OECD-DAC donors are 
increasingly abandoning the donor--recipient relationship, NGDOs in the Global North rethink 
their relationships with their partners in the South, the private sector sees its place as a 
development actor strengthened. At the same time, development cooperation, as a space for 
action previously dominated by bilateral cooperation agencies, multilateral and civil society 





"Towards an open, fair and sustainable Europe in the world – EU Presidency Project 2020-2022" 
organisations (CSOs, including non-governmental development organisations - NGDOs), is 
witnessing an increase in the diversity of public and private organisations that also claim 
legitimacy to act – development banks and financial institutions, transnational companies with 
development-focused missions and partnerships, philanthropic foundations, grassroot and social 
movements – and that question business as usual (Ritchey and Ponte 2014). And such 
organisational diversity is no longer North-centred (Horner e Hulme 2017). 
The future of global development: complexity, fragmentation, fragility, adaptation and 
innovation  
In short, the shape of development cooperation in the time ahead will be a function of the 
geopolitical and geo-economic changes that are taking place, driven by the impact of multiple 
crises caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Such changes help us understand that development, 
as a project and paradigm, is shifting from the international to the global arena: it is no longer a 
paradigm centred on inter-State relations and problems of/in the South, where ODA is the key 
tool; global development must consider a multitude of processes, actors and epistemologies, 
focusing on collective and shared issues, transversal to all countries, northern and southern 
(Oldekop et al. 2020). Some signs of the transition are already visible, specifically the erosion of 
the traditional centres of legitimacy and proliferation of actors that compete at different levels in 
the power structure of the current development cooperation field. But the future of development 
cooperation will also be a function of the actors’ response: will they be willing to use new 
resources, generate new ideas and consider new strategies?  If the multiplex world is multiple 
and complex, but also fragmented and fragile, development cooperation actors face risks (e.g. 
the measurable consequences of the climate emergency) and uncertainties (e.g. the emergence 
of new actors and thorny problems4). Adaptation and innovation constitute answers to the 
complexity, fragmentation, and fragility. 
The current study is divided into three parts: The first covers issues of quantity, quality 
and legitimacy in the current discussion on development cooperation and ODA, and seeks to 
look briefly at how European and Portuguese cooperation have addressed these challenges. In 
the light of development cooperation underway, the second part analyses the challenges that the 
 
4 By thorny issue we mean an economic, social, cultural or political problem that, due to its undetermined 
connection to other problems, is hard to define and on which there is no agreement between people and 
communities. Furthermore, a thorny issue does not have a replicable ‘turnkey’ solution (Rittel 1973). 
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main public and private actors of development cooperation face. The third part looks into the 
complexity, fragmentation and fragility of the multiplex world and proposes guidelines based on 
adaptation and innovation for addressing development cooperation in this uncertain context. 
Finally, the conclusion proposes avenues of thought for civil society organised in development 
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PART I:  Current challenges for development cooperation - Rethinking quantity, quality, 
and legitimacy 
In this new context of political and economic change at the global level, the role of ODA 
and of the traditional development cooperation actors has been challenged in three dimensions: 
quantity, quality, and legitimacy. 
 
 
1.1 On the quantity and quality of ODA 
The main official aid instrument offered by traditional OECD-DAC donors since the 1960s 
together with debt forgiveness and technical assistance, ODA has been losing relevance as a 
source of development finance for most developing countries. The diversity of instruments 
available in development finance has increased substantially since the beginning of the 21st 
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Figure 1: Development financing in the 21st century 
Source: UNDP (2014). 
 
The exception to this new reality of development financing is still Low-income countries 
or countries that are faced with severe institutional, political, social and economic crises, whose 
budgets remain dependent on ODA (Chart 2). Private financial flows, such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI), emigrant remittances or philanthropy, are increasingly important, as Charts 1 
to 4 highlight. Although ODA remains a stable flow, it did not increase significantly from 2003 to 
2016, contrary to what happens in the trajectory of non-ODA flows (which include FDI) and 
emigrant remittances, as we can see in Chart 1: non-ODA flows show a particularly sharp 
increase in the periods 2004-2007 and 2013-2016, stabilising during the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis (and in the post-crisis period). As countries’ income levels (low, lower-middle, 
upper-middle) increase, the relative importance of ODA as a development finance flow 
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decreases (Charts 2, 3 and 4) – in the case of upper-middle income countries, the other non-ODA 
flows are now by far the most important source of development financing.   
Chart 1: Flows of funds to low- and middle-income countries, 2002-2017 
 
Title: Blue=ODA, Yellow=Emigrant remittances, Grey=Other non-ODA flows (include Foreign 
Direct Investment),   







5 http://www.oecd.org/development/beyond-oda.htm  
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Chart 2: Flows of funds to low-income countries, 2002-2017 
 
Title: Blue=SDA, Yellow=Emigrant remittances, Grey=Other non-SDA flows (include Foreign 
Direct Investment),   










6 http://www.oecd.org/development/beyond-oda.htm  
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Chart 3: Flows of funds to low-middle income countries, 2002-2017 
 
Title: Blue=SDA, Yellow=Emigrant remittances, Grey=Other non-SDA flows (include Foreign 
Direct Investment),   








7 http://www.oecd.org/development/beyond-oda.htm  
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Chart 4: Flows of funds to upper-middle income countries, 2002-2017 
 
Title: Blue=SDA, Yellow=Emigrant remittances, Grey=Other non-SDA flows (include Foreign 
Direct Investment),   
Source: OECD (2021)8 
The adoption of the Agenda 2030 reinforced the progressive loss of importance of ODA 
as a financial instrument for development. According to UNCTAD (2014), 2.5 billion dollars are 
needed every year to achieve the SDG. However, such needs are unevenly distributed between 
countries and sectors (Gaspar et al. 2019). From the beginning of the Agenda 2030, it has been 
recognised that ODA alone will not be sufficient to meet financing needs. This view ultimately 
helps to raise awareness of the idea that only through the private (corporate) sector will it be 
possible to fill in the global development financing gap. DAC members quickly embraced this 
idea (GPEDC 2017). In this context, not only is the participation of the private sector as an actor 
in and of development cooperation no longer questioned, but its materialisation eventually 
 
8 http://www.oecd.org/development/beyond-oda.htm  
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impacted the ‘modernisation’ of ODA within the OECD-DAC and began to accelerate after the 
HighLevel Meeting on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (South Korea) in 2011.  
On the other hand, the discussion on the quality of ODA or, in other words, on the impact 
and efficacy of ODA, has been around for at least as long as ODA itself (Bernardo 2019). We 
find views on this issue in literature that are positive (Sachs 2005; Burnside e Dollar 1997), 
negative (Easterly 2014; Ferguson 1994; Moyo 2009) and ambivalent (Yanguas 2018; Riddell 
2008; Chambers 2017). Assessing the impact and effectiveness of ODA depends on many 
factors: the starting point, the context, what is meant by success. It is not a story that is 
straightforward or easy to analyse or communicate. However, the difficulty in proving the impact 
of ODA, which was made clear in the outcomes of the Millennium Development Goals 
(underperforming, except for China's success), contributed to the erosion of public confidence in 
the sector and was also an impetus for the aid effectiveness agenda, adopted at the High-Level 
Meetings on Aid Effectiveness in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). 
For decades, the OCDE-DAC has been in charge of assessing its members’ ODA 
quantitatively and qualitatively, based on a grants or concessional loan-focused framework 
(below market value). However, since 2019, the OECD-DAC has come to accept the inclusion 
of financial instruments that support private sector investment in developing countries (known as 
PSIs or Private Sector Instruments) in ODA accounting.9 A key actor for managing these PSIs is 
the Development Finance Institution (DFI). DFIs are financial institutions – entirely or partially 
State-owned – that pursue public interests, whose main function is to support private sector 
investment in developing countries. 
The ‘modernisation’ of ODA accounting has included designing and implementing a new 
statistical measure of quantifying development cooperation, in a process led by the OECD-DAC 
with the international community: Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD). 
The OECD-DAC defines TOSSD as ‘all officially supported resource flows to promote 
sustainable development in developing countries, to support development enablers and to 
address global challenges at regional or global levels’ (OECD 2016). Nevertheless, it is not clear 
 
9 The PSIs can support ODA in two ways: institutionally and instrumentally. Institutionally, all public 
financing inputs to DFIs may be included as ODA. Instrumentally, DFI guarantees or shareholdings in 
private companies in developing countries can be counted as ODA. 
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how the impact of TOSSD is assessed compared to traditional ODA.  ODA will continue to be 
applied only to OCDE-DAC members and other countries that follow the rules set by the 
organisation (OECD 2017). In addition to these changes, the 2008 financial crisis affected the 
main donor countries more directly and forced them to rethink their ODA strategies, by fostering 
the discussion described above around their relevance and effectiveness and the reassessment 
of their international commitments. 
1.2 On the legitimacy of development cooperation 
Through TOSSD10, the OECD-DAC seeks to align its statistical system with the more 
diverse arena of development financing beyond ODA. This is being shaped, not only by the 
economic and geopolitical impact of the ‘emergence of the South’ (OECD 2010; UNDP 2013; 
Hackenesh and Janus 2013; Pietersen 2018), guided by growing South-South cooperation 
(SSC) led by new Asian donors, such as China or Middle Eastern donors (e.g. Turkey, Qatar, 
UAE or Saudi Arabia), but also by a growing number of non-state actors acting globally (like 
foundations or non-governmental organisations) and with alternative models of intervention. Most 
new donors from the ‘South’ seem less concerned about normative discourse (upholding human 
rights or good governance) or transparency or accountability of the ODA delivered, which have 
dominated the agenda of traditional donors. They are more focused on achieving economic 
gains, primarily commercial or geopolitical, through development cooperation (Chin and Quadir 
2012; Mawdsley 2018; Mawdsley, Kim, and Marcondes 2017; Puppim de Oliveira and Jing 2020; 
Tapscott, Jing, and Oliveira 2019). This difference in the way development cooperation is put 
into practice has fostered an increasing analysis of the vision, mission and practice of 
development cooperation, particularly by traditional bilateral donors, who have started to value 
the principle of ‘mutual benefit’, in political, economic and commercial terms (Gulrajani e Faure 
2019).  
The High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan (South Korea) in 2011 soon 
after the financial crisis in Europe (two years earlier), signals a transition stage in the 
development cooperation arena – the recognition of these new donors that are not members of 
the OECD-DAC – and a clear weakening of the leadership capacity of traditional donors, such 
as the EU, in comparison with their role in the previous two forums in Paris (2005) and Accra 
(2008). The Busan Declaration incorporates this new logic under five fundamental points. First, 
 
10 http://www.oecd.org/dac/tossd/  
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the discourse on ODA is replaced by the focus on cooperation and real development. ‘Aid’ is 
dropped and is replaced by ‘cooperation’. The Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation stems from the new centrality of effectiveness and has been the subject of relevant 
debate (Blampied 2016; Klingebiel and Li 2016). The policy implications are only beginning to 
see the light of day a decade after it was established (Taggart 2020), and it is recognised that 
the discourse on effectiveness has not produced the expected effects (Klingebiel et al. 2020). 
Brown (2020) argues that OECD-DAC donors, when faced with legitimacy issues and the 
changes to the development cooperation arena, were reluctant to adopt the Paris Agenda and 
made no effort to convince emerging donors to adhere to the ODA effectiveness rule. Secondly, 
‘developing countries’ were recognised as actual partners, thereby declaring the mutual benefits 
of the partnership.  Under the terms of the emerging discourse on partnerships, which refers to 
more horizontal and less hierarchical relationships, Busan brought innovation by recognising 
other donors outside the OECD-DAC framework, such as China (the most obvious case), Russia, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates (Lauria and Fumagalli 2019).  Third, the 
activities that involve adaptation and monitoring of rules on the field are no longer led by the 
OECD-DAC and are decentralised to other organisations that are not ‘donor forums’, e.g. the 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Fourth, the private sector emerges 
as the ideal partner for development cooperation (Mawdsley 2015). Finally, in fifth and last 
place, flexibility and cooperation action is fostered in order to accept the involvement of new 
donors in the system that do not agree with or are not interested in adopting the rules developed 
under the OECD-DAC.  
In this new context of fragmentation of actors and practices in development cooperation, 
accompanied by a debate on the uncertain future of the quantity and quality of ODA as evaluation 
measures set by the main group of donor countries in the OECD-DAC framework, the traditional 
multilateral (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund or European Union) and 
bilateral organisations (such as the cooperation agencies of the OECD-DAC member countries), 
which have been leading and setting the rules of the game in the sector, have been rethinking 
and readjusting their role and future trajectories. Some trends are increasingly gaining ground: 
(1) They begin to make room in their priorities for economic growth, job creation and infrastructure 
construction, in addition to the traditional social sectors, such as education or health; (2) ODA is 
now used as a catalyst for private investment through new forms of financing, e.g. blended 
finance (3) The private sector is now regarded and promoted as an ideal partner for development 
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cooperation; and (4) The mediation of effectiveness seems to be no longer subject to the 
principles defined in the 2005 Paris Agreement – ownership, alignment (predictability and 
decoupling), harmonisation, result-based management (impact assessment and monitoring), 
and mutual accountability. Instead, the effectiveness of development cooperation now appears 
to be subject to the dilemmas and tensions that emerge from the desire to defend national 
interests, while responding to global welfare needs (Gulrajani 2017). A good example is the 
recent importance of ODA/ development cooperation securitisation, particularly after the crisis of 
the Common European Asylum System from 2015 to 2018.  The securitisation of ODA/ 
development cooperation reveals how geopolitical and geo-economic interests, although varying 
from one EU country to another, are key to determining what is effective (Brown e Grävingholt 
2016).  
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BOX 1 #TeamEurope: The geopolitics of European cooperation  
The new European Commission (EC) presided over by Ursula von der Leyen, who took office in September 2019, 
has categorically assumed the vision of the ‘Geopolitical Commission’, engaged in sustainable policies and the 
relations with the African continent. The new EC President’s first trip outside Europe was to the African Union (AU), 
in Addis Ababa. The African continent emerges as a ‘key partner’ for the EU due to the challenges concerning peace 
and security, climate change, migration, and economic growth. In March 2020, the EU launched its new strategy for 
Africa in search of a partnership between equals based on pragmatism, values, and common principles. The 
appointment of Jutta Urpilainen as Commissioner for ‘International Partnerships’ (replacing ‘International Cooperation 
and Development’) also hints at von der Leyen’s vision for European development cooperation: more political and 
strategic (Teevan and Sheriff, 2019, p.4). In her mission letter to the new Commissioner, von der Leyen emphasises 
the need to ensure a ‘cost-effective European development model that contributes to our broader policy priorities’1. 
Poverty reduction, and possibly eradication, which is enshrined in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty as the main objective of the 
European development cooperation, is not mentioned in the letter. The fact is European development cooperation 
has been changing since the Agenda for Change was launched by the EC in 2011. [This is] a change that has not 
only differentiated the countries that can still receive European ODA, but it has also prioritised private sector 
partnership as a way to achieve economic growth and job creation in partner countries. This partnership is founded 
on the development of new financial instruments (blended finance), combining official ODA and other private and/or 
public financial resources, such as loans, guarantees or venture capital. Meanwhile, the new financial instruments 
provided the opportunity to reassess the architecture of European financing of development cooperation. In 2017, the 
EC published the External Investment Plan (EIP) of the EU, which includes a European Fund for Sustainable 
Development (EFSD), worth more than 4 billion euro and aimed at leveraging over 44 billion euro of investments by 
2020. Under the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 2021-2027), European financing for development 
cooperation (which already includes the EDF, European Development Fund) is available on a single platform: the 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), with around 79.4 billion. Through 
the NDICI, the EU will also support sustainable investment worldwide under the European Fund for Sustainable 
Development Plus (EFSD+). This will be done by leveraging private capital that is added to EU ID grants. The EFSD+ 
will be backed by a €53.4 billion External Action Guarantee. Finally, in October 2019, the high-level Committee of 
Wise Men, created by the European Union Council to rethink the future of the European Union’s design of 
development for financing, suggested that an EU Climate and Sustainable Development Bank be created, by 
combining the financial resources of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and the EC.  
 













BOX 2: Portuguese development cooperation: The challenge of the private sector for development   
In recent years, the Portuguese government has shown an increasing interest in involving the private sector 
in its development cooperation. Its Strategic Concept for Development cooperation 2014-2020 emphasises 
the will to support private sector development in partner countries, either by fostering an enabling 
environment for business or through partnerships. The Portuguese private sector will be key to these 
partnerships and the Concept highlights further the importance of promoting partnerships between NGDOs 
and Portuguese companies. Concerning the financing of private sector development cooperation initiatives, 
the Concept grants SOFID, the Portuguese financial institution for development, a lead role. Around 70 to 
80% of the Portuguese financing flows to development, either ODA or non-ODA, targeting Portuguese-
speaking countries in Africa (PALOP). The latest economic and financial crisis impacted Portuguese 
cooperation significantly, by weakening its human and financial resources and, therefore, its response to the 
changes taking place in development cooperation globally. In PALOP countries particularly, where South-
South Cooperation, involving new non-DAC donors, in particular, is growing considerably.  
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PART II: The new challenges facing public and private development cooperation actors 
2.1 ‘Public’ actors 
Institutionalised ODA developed in the 1950s and was regarded as an important 
instrument for achieving international agreed goals (Williams 2014). In the beginning, ODA was 
mostly bilateral, i.e. a donor country would set its own ODA policy and engaged directly with the 
recipient country. As bilateral ODA became standard practice, multilateral institutions such as 
the World Bank (WB) and other UN agencies created during the same period began to receive 
ODA from their members. Since then, development cooperation has centred on two types of 
public players: development cooperation agencies and multilateral institutions in charge of 
managing bilateral and multilateral ODA, respectively. In the last decade, another public player 
(often with private equity, depending on the country) has been gaining ground with the rise of the 
private sector as a key partner in development cooperation and the emergence of ODA-backed 
financial instruments to catalyse its investment: development finance institutions (DFIs). In this 
section, we look at these three players – bilateral development cooperation agencies, multilateral 
institutions, and development finance institutions – which we classify as ‘public’ (despite the 
growing influence of ‘private’ players, such as the business sector or NGDOs in their common 
activities in a multiplex world), the challenges they face in the current context, and the 
implications thereof for the future of development cooperation. 
2.1.1 Bilateral cooperation agencies 
             Between the end of the Cold War and the approval of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the dominant and guiding narrative of development cooperation had a strong altruistic 
and international solidarity component. In recent years, however, the discourse has changed and 
the ‘era of national interests’ is upon us (Gulrajani 2017). Cooperation agencies these days 
navigate between responding to the needs of communities abroad, geopolitical priorities and 
domestic interests (Gulrajani e Calleja 2021).  And they must deal with these dilemmas within 
government structures whose mission is precisely to defend national interests. Gulrajani and 
Calleja (2017) highlight several trends that explain the change in the narrative.  
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First, in domestic terms, fiscal austerity as a financial and political principle, together with 
the political will to use ODA as a diplomatic (political/trade) tool or to control migratory flows, has 
put pressure on the agencies’ own budgets and on their core mission since the Millennium 
Declaration in 2000, i.e. fighting global poverty.  
Secondly, since the second half of the 21st century, we have seen wealth shift from North 
to South (OECD 2010), along with a significant improvement in human development (UNDP 
2013): “It is no longer enough to divide the world simply between North and South, developed 
and developing countries” (OCDE 2010). Emerging economies and a growing middle class in the 
South are now regarded by donors as potential markets for investment and trade. Such trends 
already seem to have influenced the fact that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed 
upon in 2015, unlike the MDGs, are not just for ‘developing countries’, but for all countries. Or 
the WB decision in April 2016 to drop the distinction between developed and developing countries 
in their annual World Development Indicators report 11. Or the growing focus and discussion on 
the distribution of poverty and inequality in countries in the North and the South. The highest 
levels of poverty are currently found in middle-income countries and not in countries with a lower 
income. The World Bank indicates that 75% of the World population and 62% of the poor in the 
world live in middle-income countries. Simultaneously, these countries account for 1/3 of the 
global GDP and they are considered the drivers of growth in the world12. This fresh look at the 
South is likely to have implications for ODA and the development cooperation agencies’ mission.  
Third, in this new global economic landscape, the growing South-South cooperation, 
based on principles of partnership among equals and on values such as solidarity and reciprocity, 
challenges and questions the vision of charity that was built up over decades of a relationship 
between a generous ‘donor’ in the North and a poor ‘recipient’ in the South (Fukuda-Parr e Shiga, 
2016).  Consequently, the traditional donors, in particular under the OECD-DAC, have been 
abandoning the altruistic motivations in favour of the principle of ‘mutual benefit’, in political, 
economic and commercial terms (Gulrajani and Faure 2019; Keijzer and Lundsgaarde 2018; 
Kharas and Rogerson 2017). Finally, the observation that a number of factors with a strong 
impact on development – such as illegal financial flows, tax havens, refugee movements, 




12 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mic/overview  
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global concertation. All of these trends and pressures are shaping the narrative of development 
cooperation and the mission of the development cooperation agencies, forcing them to find a 
balance between the enhanced promotion of national interests and the altruistic guidelines that 
they have followed in the last decades.  
2.1.2 Multilateral institutions   
Since the Second World War, multilateral institutions have performed a key role in 
development cooperation and ODA. Although there is no consensus about the reasons 
(international solidarity, domestic or geopolitical interests) for Member States of multilateral 
institutions to grant them ODA, what the studies do show is that development cooperation from 
multilateral institutions tends to be more transparent (Aid Transparency Index)13 and that the 
advantages of multilateral ODA lie in ‘their ability to collectively organise, pool and advance 
common global causes’ (Gulrajani 2016).  
The latest OECD report on multilateral development financing (2020) reveals that 
multilateral ODA has been growing since 2012 and totalled USD71.9 billion in 2018, accounting 
for 38% of all ODA. The report highlights that OECD-DAC members are still the main 
shareholders and lenders of multilateral institutions. Their contributions accounted for ¾ of all 
funding of the UN development system. However, the increase in multilateral contributions is 
related to the growth of earmarked flows that are to be used for specific programmes only. This 
is seen as potentially undermining the advantages of multilateral ODA by making it ‘bilateralised’, 
i.e. potentially subject to donor control and interests, while benefiting from the multilateral ‘brand’. 
Increasing the volume of flows of this sort is justified by the growing number of humanitarian 
interventions in the last decade (OECD 2020), as can be seen from Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Multilateral contributions by sector, 2011-2018 
 
13 https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2020/  
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Source: OECD (2020)14 
If the growth in earmarked funds continues, while funding for multilateral structures 
declines, it can ultimately have the effect of negatively influencing the strategic priorities and 
capacities of multilateral institutions and create what the report calls an ‘à la carte’ multilateral 
system . This trend may result from differences between the views that key donors of the OECD-
DAC have of the roles, priorities and operations of multilateral institutions. Since the funding of 
multilateral institutions relies ultimately on a small number of countries out of the 195 members 
(36% of all funding in 2018 was provided by the US, UK and Germany), they can easily become 
vulnerable to the influence of individual donors. Currently, the greatest challenge of multilateral 
institutions is possibly how to maintain their independence and serve common global causes in 
a multiplex world.  
 
2.1.3 Development finance institutions (DFI) 
The enhanced role of the private sector in development cooperation and the development 
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of giving greater public visibility to DFIs. The emergence of DFIs is directly linked with blended 
finance, because the role of these public institutions (although it is not uncommon for them to 
have private shareholders) is to stimulate private sector investment in ‘developing countries’ 
through a range of financial tools, such as loans, equity or guarantees. From 2005 to 2017, 
European DFIs increased their investments almost fourfold, from 10.9 billion euro at the end of 
2005 to 46 billion euro at the end of 201915. While, until recently, the weak monitoring of DFIs 
allowed them to focus primarily on the financial return on their investments, their increasing 
visibility is forcing them to also respond to the requirements of impact on sustainable 
development in the countries receiving support from private investment. Finally, traditional 
donors, specially under the OECD-DAC, tend to value political, economic or commercial ‘mutual 
benefit’, which has benefitted DFIs since they are endowed with larger amounts of public capital. 
The opportunity that ODA modernisation offers to incorporate PSI under the OECD-DAC further 
strengthens the future role of DFIs in development cooperation. However, greater visibility and 
importance is attached to the challenge of enhanced scrutiny by civil society, which requires 
more transparency of its activities and investments and impact assessment.   
  
2.2 ‘Private’ actors 
In the previous design of development cooperation, prior to the Busan Partnership (2011), 
where ODA accounted for the largest amount of financing flows to poorer countries, NGDOs 
were the most significant ‘private’ players. In the 1990s and 2000s, international civil society 
organisations, mostly the ones based in northern countries, participated actively both in actions 
on the ground in southern countries and in awareness-raising and advocacy campaigns in rich 
countries, such as the Jubilee 2000 campaign, which called for the cancellation of debt of the 
poorest countries and the Stand Up Against Poverty1 campaign. Designed and implemented in 
a multiplex world, different from the one that saw the birth of the Millennium Agenda, the 2030 
Agenda brought another ‘private’ actor to the centre of the debate: companies, whose position 
and role as an development cooperation actor is transformed by the new global agenda for 
sustainable development. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the philanthropic sector (large 
private foundations) is also asserting itself as an actor that is becoming ever more important and 
interested in bringing not only its media and financial power to the development cooperation 
 
15 https://www.edfi.eu/members/facts-figures/ 
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arena, but also its pro-market and pro-private sector vision, helping to fragment the system 
(Banks e Hulme 2014; Bishop e Green 2009; McGoey 2015). The OECD-DAC already has a 
working area dedicated to philanthropy and has in recent years established a network that allows 
it to gather and consolidate data on the financial flows mobilised by 143 foundations, including 
33 of the largest foundations working in the development cooperation sector (OECD 2018). This 
chapter discusses these three actors – the private (corporate) sector, the philanthropic sector 
and NGDOs16 – which we classify as ‘private’ (although we know that the differences are 
increasingly unclear in the multiplex world), the challenges they face in the current context and 
their implications for the future of development cooperation.  
2.2.1 Private sector (corporate) 
Since the Meeting in Busan in 2011 the private sector has become a formal player within 
and of development cooperation. Not only will the private sector bring financial capacity to meet 
the 2030 Agenda, but it will deliver the capacity to drive innovation-based economies of scale 
and impact, which is key (Steiner 2018; Young and Woods 2019). The private sector has always 
been of crucial significance in the context of development cooperation, as mentioned by Bracking 
(2009), Kindornay and Reilly-King (2013), Lucci (2012) or Mawdsley (2014). The globalisation of 
production networks and value chains from the 1970s to the 1990s (Gereffi 2018) reinforced the 
centrality of these organisations in economic operations with concrete impact on global 
development.  In the 2030 Agenda, the role of the private sector is more central than its role in 
the MDGs (Scheyvens, Banks, e Hughes 2016). This centrality also increases the number of 
roles that companies can play for development. Table 1 suggests a typology, adapted by 
Kindornay (2016: 42), as suggested by Vaes and Huyse (2015, 27–28). Private sector 
participation in development cooperation is regarded as the necessary lever for an intervention 
of scale and impact of national cooperation agencies, narrowing gaps in the quantity and also 
the quality of ODA. Nowadays, the private sector’s biggest challenges include regulatory 
requirements with impact on operations, such as the reporting of the actual (or material) impact 
 
16 We are using the definition of NGDO proposed by Fowler (2011): the sub-group of NGOs (volunteer, 
not-for-profit, non-governmental organisations) that operate in the context of X. The author notes that 
NGDOs are, in general: a) separate in terms of legitimacy and governance from government institutions; 
b) they support and use the pillars of ODA as the basis for their existence; c) they obtain public support, 
either directly or through taxes, in part because they do not aim to generate wealth for their members; d) 
they operate at any or all levels of social and political organisation, from the local level of the individual, 
families, households and others to the transnational levels and they express concerns, presence and 
relationships at the global level; and e) they are not affiliated with any party. 
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of companies (GRI 2016: 10–11; 2018a) or economic, social and environmental outturn accounts 
(GRI 2018b) – supporting their role as actors in development cooperation in the framework of the 
2030 Agenda.  
Table 1: The Role of the Private Sector in development cooperation 
Beneficiary Projects or initiatives with development goals 
Implementer New business models with purposeful and specific impact on 
development 
Reformer Adaptation of existing business models to development goals 
Source of resources Private resource allocation to external projects 
Participant Engagement in initiatives 
Target Lobbying target to change practices 
 
Source: Kindornay (2016), adapted by Bernardo (2019) 
 
2.2.2 Philanthropic sector  
The increasing weight of philanthropic funds is one of the most evident trends in 
development cooperation. Data from 2018 on 47 countries (26 OECD-DAC members and a 
selection of middle-income countries with available data, including India, China, South Africa and 
Turkey), included in the Global Philanthropy Tracker 2020, show that philanthropic flows now 
account for 8% of all development financial flows to low- and middle-income countries. Although 
it is the smallest flow of the four analysed, as shown in Figure 3, the analysis of developments 
from 1991 to 2018 in the same paper shows a steady and substantial increase in philanthropic 
flows, especially since 2004, and the decline in the relative importance of ODA compared to the 
other flows, as already mentioned in Part I of this study (Indiana University Lilly Family School of 
Philanthropy 2020).17  
 
 
17 However, the Global Philanthropy Tracker highlights that the data available is not always the same 
throughout the period analysed, 1991-2018. 
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Figure 3: Total Financial Flows for Development (2018) (millions of dollars adjusted to 
inflation) 
 
Source: Global Philanthropy Tracker, Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
(2020) 
The 2016 Global Philanthropy Index report (Hudson Institute 2016) estimated that 
philanthropy in OECD-DAC countries amounted to 45% of total ODA in those countries and data 
in the 2020 report show that OECD-DAC members are responsible for 99% of philanthropic flows 
originating in high-income countries.18 These flows account for more than 0.10% of the GNI of 9 
countries analysed, led by the US (0.23%), Denmark (0.21%) and the UK (0.18%). In absolute 
terms, the USA is still by far the largest source of philanthropic funds and the only country where 
philanthropic flows are greater than ODA. Portugal is still part of the group of countries where 
these flows are not significant, amounting to USD10 million of philanthropic funds in 2018, which 
represents 0.004% of the GNI. The weight of philanthropy by sector of activity is high in the global 
health sector (OECD 2018), where the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) has become 
a key actor, as illustrated in Figure 4. Education and support for civil society (and issues of 
 
18 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Switzerland, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America. 32 countries, of which 26 are members of DAC. 
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democratic participation and governance) are other important areas of philanthropic activity, and 
environmental issues (combating the climate emergency) are gaining ground (OECD 2017). 
Figure 4: Top 5 sectors benefitting from philanthropic funds, 2013-2015 (in billion dollars) 
 
Source: OECD (2017) 
Like the non-DAC donors or the private corporate sector, other ‘new actors’ as they are 
called, the participation of philanthropic foundations in ICD is not a new phenomenon, but it has 
become more evident and more relevant over the past decades, and not only thanks to their 
increased financial importance (Banks and Hulme 2014; OECD 2018; ODI 2016). Today's 
philanthropists differ in many ways from the 19th and early 20th century American philanthropists, 
industrialists such as Henry Ford, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie. Although they were 
influenced by calls for the wealthiest people to actively contribute and participate in social 
protection systems, such as those made by Andrew Carnegie, today’s billionaires, like Bill Gates 
and Warren Buffet, go far beyond this vision of welfarism and supplementing State aid 
(Giridharadas 2018; McGoey 2015). They believe that they can, on the one hand, use the 
knowledge and skills they deployed to build their successful companies to solve the world's 
problems and, on the other hand, that they will be able at the same time to revolutionise the 
philanthropic and development cooperation sector in general, which they consider to be 
inefficient and unable to solve global problems (Bishop e Green 2009). This new way of doing 
philanthropy, which is intrinsically linked to the development of capitalism and is characterized 
by the use of methods traditionally employed by the business sector in the non-profit sector is 
called philanthrocapitalism (Giridharadas 2018; McGoey 2015). More than a moral duty, 
philanthropy becomes an investment, the use of business jargon in the sector grows, and 
concepts such as venture philanthropy appear (an appropriation of the venture capital concept). 
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Market economy is not regarded as a problem or as a cause of social problems or inequalities, 
but as part of the solution (Kumar 2019) and as another opportunity to obtain return on 
investments.  
Although it contributes towards a greater diversity of sources of financing that 
governments of low- and middle-income countries can have access to, philanthrocapitalism 
must, nevertheless, justify its legitimacy in the development cooperation arena. The new 
philanthropy is the result of the profoundly unequal development of modern capitalism and 
perpetuates power asymmetries in development aid, further reinforcing the idea that the richest 
people on the planet have the legitimacy to impose their views and can more easily influence 
policies than democratically elected governments (McGoey 2015). Opening up the development 
cooperation space – either in the context of multilateralism, direct relations with governments or 
civil society groups – and the public debate space itself to philanthrocapitalists could overshadow 
the fact that many of them have made their fortunes due in part to tax breaks and the fact that 
many foundations are also used as ways to avoid paying higher taxes (Oxfam 2019; 2020), in 
addition to raising questions linked to the democratic legitimacy of these actors (Banks and 
Hulme 2014). The example of the World Health Organization (WHO) and its relationship with 
BMGF, which became public when the US suspended payments to the WHO in April 2020, in 
the early days of the pandemic, was a major blow to the multilateral system's global crisis 
management capacity and the result of a multiplexed geopolitical system and an increasingly 
fragmented development cooperation (Fejerskov 2015; The Guardian 2020; Politico 2017).   
2.2.3 NGDOs 
Heirs to 19th century transnational activism, such as the abolitionism and the Red Cross 
movement, NGDOs as we know them today originated from the international solidarity 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, linked to the struggle for decolonisation and opposition to 
the localised and proxy conflicts of the Cold War (Davies 2014; Fowler 2011). The legacy of this 
origin is still very present in the narrative of many NGDOs, which define themselves as 
international and today present themselves as the voice of (global) civil society against the 
injustices of the development process. The importance of NGDOs as influential actors in the 
global arena was fostered by the United Nations system in the 1980s and 1990s that provided 
NGDOs from the South and the North the necessary institutional space to participate in 
international fora on issues such as human rights, population, discrimination against women, and 
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the environment (Kamat 2004; Wright 2012). However, the growth and affirmation of NGDOs as 
development cooperation actors is not linked only to the United Nations’ call for participatory 
democracy.  
Developments in the sector cannot be separated from the progress of the market 
economy and the neoliberal agenda, supported by the defence of liberal democracy. The 
liberalisation agenda of the so-called Washington Consensus in the 1980s paved the way for the 
withdrawal of the State, the privatisation of social services in developing countries, specifically 
those in Africa, and transformed many NGDOs into social service providers, in areas such as 
education and health (Fisher 1997; Thorbecke 2005), leading to the growth of the sector, as 
Figure 5 illustrates. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the democratisation and good governance 
agenda, sponsored by OECD-DAC donors and multilateral agencies, regarded organised civil 
society (in Tocqueville's classic view) as one of the pillars of liberal democracy (Fowler 2011; 
Kamat 2004).  
Figure 5: Development of European NGOs, 1945-1993 
 
Source: Development Centre OECD (Woods 2000) 
 
This development is evidenced by a continuous increase of funds, ODA funds specifically, 
to support organised civil society all around the world, contributing to the exponential growth of 
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the sector (Fowler 2011; Kamat 2004; Reinmann 2006; Wright 2012). The OECD-DAC estimates 
that, in 2018, DAC donors channelled approximately USD21 billion of ODA to and through 
organised civil society organisations, an amount equal to 15% of bilateral ODA (OECD 2020) – 
13% channelled through projects and only 2% directed to the organisations themselves for basic 
organisational support. These figures have remained relatively stable over the past eight years. 
Approximately one half of these funds were intended for social services and infrastructures and 
around a third for humanitarian aid. Overall, although the percentage values remain stable, we 
see a slight increase in the total volume of funds channelled to and through these organisations: 
from USD18.5 billion in 2010 to USD20.5 billion in 2018 (OECD 2020) (see Figure 6). These 
funds are allocated almost entirely to international organisations or organisations based in the 
donor countries; only 7% is channelled to organisations in the partner countries. 
 
Figure 6: ODA Channelled to and through CSOs, 2010-2018 (billion dollars) 
 
Source: OECD (2020) 
 
In addition to these funds there are the resources that the organisations collect from 
multilateral agencies and private actors (foundations and companies), and individual donations 
from citizens. Due to the lack of a regulatory or aggregating international body, it is impossible to 
know how many NGOs operate in the world or to have reliable disaggregated data on the total 
financial resources they deploy, especially those from private sources (Lewis and Kanji 2009; 
Wright 2012; Yanacopulos 2015; Development Initiatives 2016). Still, some studies conducted in 
the past ten years show that private financing, mainly from citizens' donations, accounts for an 
important part of the funds deployed by European NGDOs, constituting a growing trend in the 
first decade of the 21st century (Hénon et al. 2014; Development Initiatives 2016).  
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The financial crisis in 2008-2009 and the economic instability of the following decade, 
probably combined with the scepticism of the general public in regard to the impact of the work 
carried out by NGDOs, have given rise to fewer donations pledged by private citizens in the past 
years (Edwards 2018); the latest Eurobarometer shows that 22% of respondents say they give 
money to an organisation that works in international development, 5% less compared to the 
Eurobarometer in 2016 (DG DEVCO 2018). Since the beginning of the pandemic, several 
platforms of civil society organisations have sounded the alert about the impact of the crisis on 
the shortfall in resources, at a time marked by a real increase in needs on the ground (Bond 
2021; Civicus 2020a; Le Mouvement Associatif 2020). Civil society organisations have 
responded very significantly around the world, bridging state gaps and using their strong 
presence on the ground to reach out to the most vulnerable (Civicus 2020a; 2020b). According 
to a survey conducted in June 2020 by Civicus Alliance involving 127 of its members in 50 
countries, almost 90% of respondents said that their financial resources had been negatively 
affected by the pandemic: 50% had experienced lower financial inputs, but they were able to 
continue working, and 40% found themselves in dire financial straits that would soon lead to the 
cancellation of activities (Civicus 2020a).  
Like other private actors, NGDOs will also face the challenges in the coming period  
related to the changes in development cooperation in the multiplex world that we have 
emphasised in this study. We highlight six key challenges here: financing, impact evaluation, 
localisation of aid, the relationship with the private (business) sector, innovation, and the 
changing civic space.  
First, as the governments of many OECD-DAC donors are grappling with an immense 
crisis in their own countries, ODA channelled to and through SCO by these countries will most 
likely decrease or stagnate, as was the case after the financial crisis a decade ago. The same 
can be expected of private funding from citizen donations, which was already declining, as we 
have seen. This is a very likely, but also expected consequence in light of the transformations in 
the cooperation agendas of these donors, of the transition from ODA to TOSSD (see Part I and 
Part II, Chapter 1). The interviews conducted during this study with CSO platforms staff hint at a 
stronger impact of this reality on organisations of the global South than on the organisations of 
the global North, since very little ODA is channelled to and through the former. Another point 
highlighted by the interviews is the need to rethink the management structures and mechanisms 
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of NGDOs so that they can adapt to new partners and funders, against the backdrop of changes 
in financial flows to developing countries.  
Secondly, as is demanded of ODA, NGDOs are required to provide proof of the impact 
of their work (Lingán et al. 2009), in addition to the traditional data that quantifies the services 
rendered and the goods delivered (output). This is a difficult exercise in itself, because social 
change is complex and is influenced by many factors, and it is also difficult to communicate with 
audiences as diverse as partner governments, citizens and donors.  
Thirdly, an old problem, but one the pandemic crisis unveiled was the asymmetric power 
between NGDOs of the North and the South (Cornish 2019; Vielajus e Bonis-Charancle 2020; 
Currion 2020). When many countries declared states of emergency and closed their borders, 
between March and April 2020, many expatriate NGDO staff returned to their home countries, 
leaving local staff operating on their own, often rudderless, as most senior management positions 
are still held by expatriates. This event – which was most evident in humanitarian aid 
organisations and has since returned to normalcy in some places, while continuing to this day in 
others – has shown very clearly that pledges to localise aid, reiterated over the past decades in 
both the humanitarian and development sectors, are far from materialising. Moreover, the 
process of change itself still reflects a great asymmetry of power, which reinforces the idea that 
people in northern countries are more capable than people in the South. This debate relates to 
sensitive issues in the sector, such as accusations of neo-colonialism, racism, and legitimacy, 
which are at the core of the discussion on reforming the system. Furthermore, in today's multiplex 
world of globalised capitalism, local problems often have a common thread that connects them 
to problems elsewhere on the globe, North and South (Di Cesare 2020; Edwards 2020).  
Fourth, the private sector is no longer regarded in the 2030 Agenda as a mere donor, 
but as a full-fledged actor of and for development. Consequently, the social sector is being 
invaded by foundations, start-ups and private companies that propose to transform, and even 
revolutionise, the way development cooperation is carried out (Kumar 2019; Chang 2019). 
Despite the trend of increasing NGDO and private company partnerships in the last decade – 
partnerships that have also become more complex due to changes in the role of the private sector 
– NGDOs have had trouble recognising such complexity and the fact that the private sector no 
longer presents itself as just a funder (Molina-Gallart 2014).  
Fifthly, innovation is not an easy path for NGDOs. Despite cultivating a narrative of social 
innovators seeking alternatives to the dominant system (a vision with historical roots, as we have 
seen), the sector's development as a service provider and implementer of short- and 
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medium-term projects, and its connection to ODA (which is traditionally unwilling to take risks), 
does not foster a culture of innovation (Edwards 1997; Peach & Inventium 2016; Whitehead 
2016).  
Finally, in the face of the crisis of liberal democracy, civil society is warning about the 
narrowing civic space or, in other words, the public space that is traditionally the sphere of action 
of civil society in democracy. The latest Civicus Monitor reports (Civicus 2020c) underscore 
ongoing limitation of freedom of speech and a continued narrowing of civic space in countries in 
all regions, which the measures to restrict freedoms implemented in the name of public health in 
2020 have made worse. Furthermore, recent years have been the scene of repression in the 
public space and uprisings at the global level, with multiple episodes of demonstrations and 
resistance against the status quo (Di Cesare 2020), in which citizens and social movements are 
the lead actors, as in the case of the feminist movements in Argentina and Poland, the Black 
Lives Matter movement, and the Fridays4Future movement, led by the notable young activist, 
Greta Thunberg. 
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PART III: Reflecting on development cooperation in a complex, fragmented and fragile 
world  
Thinking of the World as multiplex, marked by uncertainty and global development 
problems that are increasingly thorny (cf. Introduction), implies reflecting about its complexity. 
ODA, as it is still overall implemented, is a complicated and linear solution to wicked problems 
(Bernardo and Silva 2019; Ramalingam, Laric, and Primrose 2014; Rittel and Webber 1973). By 
adopting the complexity perspective, it is possible to focus, not on ODA, but rather on the 
emerging, unforeseeable, and unpredictable dimension of global development. Furthermore, the 
growing diversity of (private and public) actor universes with different shapes, but similar 
approaches to the complexity, where proliferation and atomisation subsist, forces us to focus on 
fragmentation (see Part I and Part II). Finally, it is important to address fragility; it is a wicked 
issue that has undergone major developments as we learn more about its dimensions and an 
example of how a complicated problem is turned into a complex problem. 
Table 2 compares the current idea of development cooperation and how it should be 
regarded in the future: from thinking centred on the linear and complicated approach to 
complexity-centred thinking. The two differ fundamentally in the way we view the systems and 
interactions. Whilst in the current development cooperation, systems and problems are viewed 
as being closed, static and linear, future development cooperation will regard systems as open, 
dynamic and complex. For example, in today's development cooperation, policies are thought 
out and designed based on the view that interactions occur among rational individuals who seek 
to maximise their individual interests, whose behaviour and actions can be specified from the top 
(top-down), allowing future outcomes to be anticipated. In future development cooperation, by 
contrast, interactions are viewed differently: they occur between individuals who mix different 
ways of thinking and acting, and who are therefore subject to bias or making mistakes. This new 
vision requires a more focused stance on the will to learn, adapt, organise oneself and co-evolve.  
Table 2: How to think out development cooperation? 
  Current development cooperation Future development cooperation 
Systems and 
problems 
Systems and problems are closed, 
static and linear; 
Reductionist – the components 
reveal the whole 
Systems are open, dynamic, non-
linear. Macro standards result from 
interactions and micro behaviour 
Human agency Individuals are rational and 
deductive; behaviour and action can 
be established from the top; it is 
Individuals and groups mix ways of 
thinking and acting, they are 
subject to error and bias, they 
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possible to have perfect knowledge 
of future outcomes 
learn, adapt, organise themselves, 
and co-evolve over time 
Social structure Formal inter-actor relations are most 
important; social relations do not 
have history and they may be 
designed; actors can be treated as 
independent/individual 
Relations and interactions are 
important (culture, belonging to a 
community, beliefs, values); 
institutions and relations bear the 
burden of history and depend on its 
trajectory 
Change Linear relationship between cause 
and effect; change is an additional, 
direct and measurable effect of 
actions or interventions 
Complex relationship between 
cause and effect; qualitative 
change is more important; involves 
uncertainty and improbability 
Source: Ramalingam (2013: 142). 
Despite differences and sometimes conflicts, most public and private actors in 
development cooperation still adopt a linear approach in a multiplex world, operating on the world 
from a mechanical engineering perspective. A good example is the insistence on using the logical 
framework to design, implement and fund applications and proposals despite the difficulties in 
incorporating the complex dynamics of the multiplex world (Krause 2014).  
The difference between what is complicated and complex has occupied a growing 
number of analysts (Alter e Meunier 2009; Alter and Raustiala 2018; Ashoff e Klingebiel 2014; 
Orsini et al. 2020) and organisations. Understanding a system or problem as complicated 
suggests that it is possible to break it down and analyse each component separately 
(Ramalingam 2013): a complicated system is composed of multiple parts that interact in 
predictable ways and produce an expected outcome. On the other hand, a complex system may 
be composed of few parts, but they all interact in predictable and unpredictable ways, producing 
unforeseeable outcomes. In the former, a watch or a car are complicated. But the mechanics of 
a watch are easily removed, analysed and replaced if one has the necessary technical 
knowledge. In the latter, a human being or an economy are complex. Analysing a leg or an arm 
and how it mechanically interacts with the brain does not help us understand our consciousness, 
just as looking at a monetary system does not help us understand why some countries develop 
and others do not. 
In the first part of the report, we described a set of changes that implicitly recognise the 
complexity of the multiplex world, but they still involve solutions that exclude the relationships 
between multiple systems. For example, the Busan declaration acknowledges the complexity of 
the architecture and the actors, which suggests that it is an advancement vis-à-vis the Paris and 
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Accra declarations. However, it suggests that development cooperation ‘plays a catalytic and 
indispensable role’ in the search for solutions, without recognising that such solutions operate 
beyond the ‘interdependence and coherence of all public policies’ and act upon themselves – in 
essence, the policy coherence agenda reduces the complexity of interactions in a multiplex world 
and assumes a certain linearity between policies and outcomes, often forgetting that the 
configuration of these policies results from relationships of power between different political, 
economic and social actors.  
To look at development cooperation through the prism of complexity also means that, in 
addition to development cooperation localisation being a legitimate aspiration, it is a challenge 
with the potential to transform that goes beyond the results that are readily observable. If, in their 
own contexts, the individuals, communities and NGDOs tend to have a better understanding of 
their priorities, that understanding is the driver of adaptive change in the sector. Owen Barder 
suggests that the potential complexity approach can deliver seven ‘lessons’ to development 
actors (2012b). Table 3 lays out the seven lessons of complexity in addressing development and 
provides examples of ongoing transformation in several fields and led by various actors, which 
fit into each lesson.  
Table 3: Seven lessons of complexity in addressing development   
Seven “lessons” of complexity for 
development actors 
Examples of ongoing transformation in new development 
cooperation 
1. Help avoid isomorphic 
mimicry, i.e. avoid applying 
institutional models or 
public policies that donors 
regard as ideal or best 
practices 
The World Development Report 201719 of the World Bank 
acknowledges that the discourse of best practices can 
easily fail, because it ignores complex historical, political, 
and social realities. 
2. Resist fatalism, i.e. recognise 
that the complexity of the 
multiplex world creates 
uncertainty about outcomes, 
but does not determine 
them. 
The NEAR (Network for Empowered Aid Response)20 is a 
movement of local and national CSOs of the Global South 
that share the common goal of promoting fair, equitable and 
dignified partnerships in the framework of today's 
development cooperation. 
 
3. Promote innovation, i.e. 
support the idea of 
innovation as a public good 
The Transformative Innovation Policy Consortium (TIPC)21 
seeks to promote a new public policy framework for 
innovation aligned with the need to solve social and 
 
19 https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017  
20 https://www.near.ngo/who-we-are-copied  
21 https://www.tipconsortium.net/  
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in a context where 
complexity eliminates the 
determinism of 
development.  
environmental issues. According to this new framework, the 
North-South divide no longer applies, paving the way for 
knowledge-sharing and iterative learning.  
4. Embrace creative destruction, 
i. e. recognise that, despite 
the negative connotation, 
‘creative destruction’ 
describes a selection 
process and this process 
depends on concrete 
choices and preferences.  
The focus on cash transfers in the humanitarian aid sector, 
which have been used in substantially higher volumes in 
recent years, is transforming the way many UN 
organisations and agencies work, with a bearing on social 
protection system discussions22.  
During the pandemic, Oxfam International unveiled a 
restructuring plan23 that involves closing down operations in 
18 countries and laying off 1,500 employees. There are 
several reasons for the decision, but the official narrative 
describes the will to create a global, horizontal alliance of 
organisations working for social justice24. 
5. Shape development, i.e.  The 
complexity of the multiplex 
world shows us that it is 
possible to shape 
development without being 
tempted to plan it, 
recognising that there are 
different actors with 
different needs, values, and 
priorities. 
The Developmental Leadership Program (DLP)25 funded by 
the Australian Cooperation and Asia Foundation has 
revealed, through several case studies, how change is, 
above all, the result of building ‘coalitions for change’. Tools 
such as the Theory of Change26, Adaptive Management27, 
and Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)28 allow you 
to approach development in a non-linear way that is not as 
tightly bound to a predefined plan. 
 
6. Embrace experimentation, i.e. 
the multiplex world is an 
experimental world that 
recognises the ongoing and 
iterative interaction between 
various actors.  
There are several examples of how multilateral and bilateral 
agencies, alone or in partnership with other organisations, 
are focusing on experimentation to solve global 
development problems: Global Innovation Fund29, USAID 
Global Development Lab30, the fund for innovation to be 
created soon by the AFD and which will be chaired by Nobel 
prize-winner in economics, Esther Duflo31, innovation labs in 
the United Nations agencies (such as UNICEF, the UNDP 






24 https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-in-the-face-of-covid-19-a-new-direction-for-oxfam-97287  
25 https://www.dlprog.org/  
26 https://oficinaglobal.org/2020/12/30/teoria-da-mudanca-nos-workshops-da-oficina-global/  
27 https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/adaptive-rigour-bridging-the-art-and-science-of-adaptive-management/  
28 https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/PDIAtoolkit  
29 https://www.globalinnovation.fund/  
30 https://www.usaid.gov/GlobalDevLab  
31 https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-france-to-launch-development-innovation-fund-chaired-by-
esther-duflo-98806  
32 https://acceleratorlabs.undp.org/  
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7. Start with what is close by, i.e. 
identify pressure points, in 
countries with greater 
economic and political 
muscle, on which public and 
private actors can act to 
promote a development 
cooperation architecture 
more in line with their 
preferences.  
Typically, there are more pressure points in democracies 
than autocracies; civil society plays an important role in 
increasing pressure and multiplying the points on which it 
can be applied. Campaigns for tax justice33 and ethical 
fashion34, for example, present opportunities for advocacy 
with obvious implications at the local level (where they 
identify pressure points) and important repercussions for 
global development.  
Source: Barder (2012b) and own wording. 
The actors of development cooperation tend to disregard unforeseen impacts and 
unexpected interactions as part of the function of development cooperation applied in the 
concrete environments. At the programming level, the focus on the 0.7% target is a good example 
of how linearity, easier to turn into a claim, can promote the narrowing of options and strategies. 
But how does 0.7% fit into a context where new public and private actors are participating in 
development cooperation, with this participation being transformative of the architecture itself?  
The complexity alerts development cooperation actors to the problems of linear thinking, 
but it also improves their capacity to identify features of the current system that have 
consequences seen as negative, and helps actors to look for ways to resolve, mitigate, or use 
them to produce new opportunities. One of the consequences of such complexity is possibly 
fragmentation. The entry (or recognition) of ‘new actors’ is resulting in the enhanced bargaining 
power of traditional recipients (Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde, and Cold-Ravnkilde 2017; Greenhill, 
Prizzon, and Rogerson 2016; Hernandez 2015), who have more donors to choose from. On the 
other hand, the case of China has been explored in some detail (Jepson 2019; Swedlund 2017) 
and shows how fragmentation produces contradictory effects: actors who are not governed by 
democratic principles or respect for human rights seek international legitimacy through 
development cooperation and ODA (Gulrajani 2017; Gulrajani and Faure 2019; Gulrajani and 
Swiss 2019), thereby increasing the political space (bargaining power) of traditional ODA 
recipients.  
While the entry of new actors seems to balance the distribution of power in the multiplex 
world, apparently it does not solve a particularly thorny problem: fragility. The OECD defines 
 
33 https://www.globaltaxjustice.org/  
34 https://ethicalfashioninitiative.org/ ; https://cleanclothes.org/  
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fragility as ‘the combination of exposure to risks and an insufficient capacity from States, systems 
and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate such risks" (OECD 2020). The story behind 
this concept is problematic (Brinkerhoff 2019; Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, and Nay 2014), but it takes 
us again to the issues of complexity and fragmentation. If fragmentation, as we suggest, 
increases the negotiation power of the receiving countries, it also increases the risk of being left 
an ‘orphan’ (Davies and Klasen 2019; Ellison 2016; Pietschmann 2016). Complexity entails 
emerging risks: more fragile states are more subject to the consequences of climate emergency, 
protracted conflict, or transnational tax fraud. As far as public actors are concerned, the 
problematic origin of the concept of fragility in the notion of ‘failed State’ continues to push the 
discussion on development into the realm of security (Brown e Grävingholt 2016). However, the 
2020 edition of the report States of Fragility opens up the discussion to the promotion of peace. 
By doing so it suggests that complex thinking – although it can ‘be frightening for professionals 
in fragile contexts’ (Desai and Forsberg 2020: 26) and ‘can wear down professionals who fight 
against the reality of working in fragile contexts, particularly when their log-frames demand 
concrete outcomes and products’ ??(id, ibid: 24) – helps question the discourse on good or best 
practices. Since there are no “silver bullets” (Brooks et al. 2009), it is preferable to experiment 
and change. Recent developments in fragility mitigation policies, mostly focused on systemic 
resilience and less on the conflict prevention, suggest that this is the way to go and one that we 
should not lose sight of (Cramer, Goodhand, e Morris 2016; Forsberg 2020; Lemay-Hébert 2019).  
One of the most important conclusions of this debate is that development cooperation 
and ODA are still and will continue to be critical for fragile contexts, far outweighing foreign direct 
investment or remittances. Renewed emphasis on private flows and models could have 
unintended consequences of enhanced indices of fragility. Such a possibility has been 
researched in past years (D’Alelio e Rose 2018); in spite of the exhortations (i.e. (IFC 2019; 
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Conclusion 
This study describes developments in development cooperation over the last twenty years and 
addresses the transformations underway, the various actors and how they are responding to 
change, and the challenges these same actors face in the new development cooperation arena. 
In the Introduction, we argue that the current context of international relations differs substantially 
from the post-World War II context that saw the rise of the liberal international order and the 
institutions it created (United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD, bilateral 
cooperation agencies), which underpin the ICD itself. We live today in a multiplex world, in the 
words of Amitav Acharya (2017), a world with an ever-increasing multiplicity of actors in the global 
order (States, international institutions, multinational companies, non-governmental 
organisations, individuals, transnational movements, and other non-State actors) who face 
increasingly complex, multidimensional, unpredictable global challenges that transcend borders 
and cannot be solved at the national level. These are not necessarily new problems, but they 
have become more urgent and apparent: financial crises, pandemics, migration, climate change. 
In the current setting we must analyse the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic: like other pandemics 
in the past, Covid-19 is a critical moment that is acting as a trend accelerator.  
In Part I, we show that, in this new context of political and economic change at the global level, 
the role of ODA and of the traditional development cooperation actors has been challenged in 
three dimensions, which are already visible in the Busan Declaration of 2011: quantity, quality 
and legitimacy. In quantitative terms, ODA has become increasingly irrelevant as a source of 
development financing for most developing countries. Private financial flows, such as foreign 
direct investment (FDI), emigrant remittances or philanthropy, are increasingly important, with 
the exception of low-income countries where ODA is still valuable. In qualitative terms, the 
already difficult debate on the impact and effectiveness of ODA is increasingly opaque in the 
framework of the transition from ODA to TOSSD, with the inclusion of financial instruments in 
ODA accounting that support private sector investment in developing countries.  Finally, the 
affirmation of South-South cooperation has traditional OECD-DAC donors rethinking not only 
their strategies, but also the legitimacy of a system that became shackled to the idea of the donor-
recipient relationship and a vision of a world divided between ‘rich countries of the North’ and 
‘poor countries of the South’. 
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In Part II we analyse changes in the practices of several public development actors (bilateral and 
multilateral agencies of OCDE-DAC donors, and development financing institutions) and private 
actors (corporate private sector corporate, philanthropic sector and NGDOs). We note that all of 
these actors are changing, some more proactively and others more reactively, in response to the 
new ICD in the multiplex world, which is forcing them to rethink their role and legitimacy in the 
sector, while also presenting them with new challenges. 
Finally, Part III outlines a few ideas on complexity, fragmentation and fragility, which are useful 
for development cooperation actors in the current new context. We do not have the answers, but 
we do believe that these lenses can help the ‘traditional’ development cooperation actors, such 
as Portuguese NGDOs, rethink their role and help build useful new analysis tools for their 
activities in the multiplex world. Above all, we hope the present study will help NGDOs ask the 
right questions about the challenges raised by new development cooperation, for example:  
• Against a backdrop of declining ODA and OECD-DAC centrality, what new avenues 
should be explored to diversify the sources of financing and what are the 
implications of such diversification at the level of the operational freedom of 
organisations? A good example is (re)thinking the role of the private sector in this 
scenario: can NGDOs rule out the private sector as a partner for ICD when development 
also depends on private initiative? How can we address the private sector not only as a 
donor, but also as an development cooperation actor in its own right? On the one hand, 
we have noted the increasing number of partnerships between NGDOs and private 
companies, with some highly publicised examples, such as the partnerships between 
Oxfam and Unilever and between Save the Children and GsK pharmaceuticals, two large 
multinational companies. On the other hand, we also see many organisations using their 
influence and advocacy skills to campaign for a private sector that is more aware of its 
impact on the planet and human rights, demanding transparency and stricter legal 
frameworks. There are several possible paths, with different implications, and 
organisations must think about them in the light of the multiplex world and of complexity. 
• On the other hand, given that the decades-old 0.7% target is only met by a limited 
number of countries (even smaller now that the UK has retreated), does it still make sense 
to engage in the political battle around this goal? And, if so, how to fight such a battle in 
a multiplex world where the role of ODA as a financial instrument for development is 
increasingly diminished? Should the focus shift to the new instruments of development 
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finance that rely on the allocation of public and private funds, but that are not very 
transparent in their guiding principles, objectives and results due to private sector 
participation? 
• The focus of the discussion on aid localisation, reinforced by the pandemic, but 
stemming from a long debate related to the imbalance of a sector that still takes 
refuge in an idea of northern superiority, is also a consequence of the questioning 
of the legitimacy of development cooperation actors in the multiplex world of 
globalised capitalism. The process of change itself still reflects a significant asymmetry 
of power, which reinforces the idea that people in northern countries are more capable 
than people in southern countries. What is the stance of northern NGDOS and southern 
NGDOs? What is their position and what kind of relationship do they wish to establish 
amongst themselves? Here too there are several ways forward: there are organisations 
from the North that act increasingly as advocacy organisations in their own countries and 
less as service providers in southern countries; there are others that are betting on the 
idea of complementarity of skills of organisations from the North and the South; there are 
yet others that are betting on working in global networks that are increasingly horizontal. 
• Finally, we can highlight the issue of innovation, which will stand out more and 
more in this new context and this is not an easy path for NGDOs, since their 
connection to ODA (which is traditionally not willing to take risks) does not foster 
a culture of innovation. Is this new development cooperation an opportunity for NGDOs 
to regain their initial role as social innovators, seeking alternatives to the dominant 
system? Will they be capable of or interested in developing skills for experimenting, 
learning iteratively, and above all, acknowledging the failure that is inevitable in the 
innovation process? Can they adapt their operational models, trapped in the logical 
framework required by donors, using other tools better suited to complex systems, such 
as the theory of change or adaptive management? Will there be room for more donors to 
bet on financing mechanisms fostering experimentation? Portugal, for example, has 
stood out in the area of social innovation (its Social Innovation Fund is one of a-kind in 
Europe) and has invested in diversifying the innovation ecosystem, namely in the context 
of circular economy and start-ups. However, in the field of development cooperation there 
is still no investment in innovation for development.  
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These questions are closely linked to the seven lessons on complexity identified by Owen 
Barder (2012b), which we mentioned in Part III of this study, in which innovation and 
experimentation have a prominent place, and civil society is seen as an important actor due to 
its ability to mobilise collective action and its proximity to people. We hope they will serve as a 
good start.  
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